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Abstract:
The tension between universalism and cultural relativism lies at the heart of war crimes 
and war crimes prosecutions.  While cultural relativism arguments should never be the 
basis for ignoring war crimes outside of the West (particularly in Africa), neither should 
the international community adopt a radical universalist approach that ignores the 
unique circumstances underlying each war crimes prosecution.  The establishment of the 
ICTR, over the objection of the post-genocide Rwandan government, probably erred on 
the side of universalism by ignoring the legitimate needs of the Rwandan people.  
Nevertheless, the ICTR has appropriately adopted a “mild” cultural relativist approach 
in its proceedings, by considering cultural differences when evaluating witness testimony, 
interpreting the definition of certain crimes within the context of the Rwandan 
experience, and considering Rwandan sentencing practices when sentencing defendants.  
Future international tribunals should learn from the ICTR experience and consider 
cultural differences as necessary to do justice in the communities they are designed to 
serve. 
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1“While academic debates about the possibility of objective 
truth and falsehood are often rarified to the point of 
absurdity, Rwanda demonstrated that the question is a 
matter of life and death.”1
I. Introduction
The creation of several new international war crimes tribunals over the past 
fifteen years raises a host of legal and policy issues concerning the way these tribunals 
seek to do justice.  Arguably one of the most important issues is the role, if any, that 
cultural differences should play in the establishment and operation of these tribunals.  
This issue is important because the long-run legitimacy of the tribunals will depend on 
their acceptance by both the communities in which they seek to do justice as well as the 
larger international community.  This dual acceptance, in turn, will largely depend on the 
ability of these courts to recognize and take into account cultural differences that may 
affect their ability to uncover the truth, while also ensuring that people from all 
backgrounds are equally protected from (or held accountable for) the crimes under their 
jurisdiction.  
There are easily recognizable truths on both sides of the debate.  On the one hand, 
if the international community has universally condemned a particular crime, why should 
cultural differences play any role in how an international tribunal investigates and 
prosecutes that crime?  On the other hand, how can international judges seek to 
adjudicate the guilt or innocence of individuals from a culture that is not their own, while 
also attempting to combine different legal cultures and receive evidence in a language 
that they do not speak, without recognizing and taking these differences into account?  
1 PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR 
FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 259 (1998).
2Part II of this article explores this dilemma in general terms.  First, I give a brief 
summary of the debate between universalism and cultural relativism in the field of 
international human rights.  I then argue that cultural relativism issues lie at the heart of 
war crimes and war crimes prosecutions.  The very definition of “war crimes” is affected 
by cultural relativism, and relativism is often a subtext in debates about whether war 
crimes should be addressed by international, domestic, or hybrid courts.  Moreover, even 
within the context of an international criminal tribunal, there is a need for cultural 
sensitivity in the way that tribunal seeks to do justice.
Part III of this article applies these general observations to the establishment and 
operation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR” or “Tribunal”).  
First, I set out the facts leading up the Rwandan genocide and the establishment of the 
ICTR, with an eye toward the role that the international community played in these 
events.  I then ask whether the establishment of the tribunal was reflective of a harmful 
“one size fits all” attitude in the international community, or if it was a necessary step in 
order to accord justice equally in Africa as in Europe.  I also explore select decisions of 
the ICTR with an eye toward whether, and how, these decisions were influenced by real 
or perceived cultural distinctions between the international judges and the persons before 
them.  I specifically focus on: (1) cultural factors that affect witness testimony; (2) the 
question of applying the international law of genocide in the Rwandan context; and (3) 
the role of culture in sentencing at the ICTR.  
In Part IV, I conclude that future international tribunals can learn a great deal 
from the ICTR experience.  I argue generally that sensitivity to cultural differences will 
assist international tribunals to be more effective in war crimes prosecutions, but that the 
3international community must also be careful not to allow actual or perceived cultural 
differences to become an excuse to disregard or minimize war crimes.  I specifically 
argue that international tribunals should follow the lead of the ICTR in its willingness to 
recognize and take into account cultural differences as they arise.  I also argue that hybrid 
tribunals have a better chance of striking the proper balance in this respect.  Finally, I 
argue that any international or hybrid tribunal should exercise jurisdiction only when the 
domestic courts are unable or unwilling to do so.  In this way, I advocate a “mild” 
cultural relativism approach to international war crimes prosecutions.  
II. The Cultural Relativism Debate and its Application to War Crimes and War 
Crimes Prosecutions
A.  The Universalism-Cultural Relativism Debate
One of the major ongoing debates in the field of international human rights is 
between the opposing views of universalism and cultural relativism.  Put most starkly, the 
debate is between (1) those who believe that “[h]uman rights are, literally, the rights that 
one has simply because one is a human being,”2 regardless of an individual’s location, 
culture, or background; and (2) those who maintain that at least some rights vary 
depending upon the culture to which a person belongs.
According to Professor Jack Donnelly, a Western political scientist, this debate is 
better understood as points along a continuum rather than as a choice between two 
extremes.  At one end of the spectrum, “radical” cultural relativism holds that culture is 
the only source of the validity of a human right or rule.3  On the other end of the 
spectrum, radical universalism holds that culture is completely irrelevant to the validity 
2 JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY & PRACTICE 10 (2d ed. 2003).
3 See DONNELLY, supra note 2, at 89-90.
4of these rights and rules.4  Between these two extremes lies a continuum of views ranging 
from “strong” to “weak” cultural relativism.5  Strong cultural relativists would argue that 
culture is the principal source of the validity of a right or rule, but would nevertheless 
accept the universal validity and application of a few basic rights.  Weak cultural 
relativists (strong universalists) would presume the universality of most rights and rules, 
but would hold that culture may also be an important source of the validity of others.6
In addition, one element of confusion that runs through this debate is that there 
are two different “faces,” or aspects, to cultural relativism, one generally positive and the 
other negative.  On the positive side, cultural relativism evolved largely as a reaction to 
the evils of colonialism: given the fact that “African, Asian, and Muslim (as well as Latin 
American) leaders and citizens have vivid, sometimes personal, recollections of their 
sufferings under colonial masters,” there is an understandable sensitivity to external 
pressure.7  In addition, cultural relativism may be seen as a rejection of the West’s “moral 
imperialism,” or “the rush to judge another person’s flaws without revealing or 
4 See id. at 90.
5 See id.
6 See id. 
7 See id. at 99.  Professor Donnelly also argues that this sensitivity, though understandable, is not always 
justifiable.  See id.  
5recognizing one’s own.”8  Finally, as a practical matter, human rights activists are likely 
to be more effective if they ground their advocacy in local cultural norms.9
In its negative face, however, cultural relativism arguments are often used as an 
excuse to avoid responsibility for human rights violations.  Thus regime elites often make 
cultural relativism arguments in an “attempt to deflect attention from their [own] 
repressive policies.”10 A related problem is that, although the community and the state are 
different entities, cultural relativism arguments sometimes “assume unjustifiably an 
identity between government objectives and cultural values.”11  “[P]articularly in states 
that lack democratic institutions, the crude cultural relativists’ identification of the state –
and its objectives – with the cultural values of its people remains dubious.”12
Another, slightly more subtle version of the “negative face” of cultural relativism 
is that of the international community ignoring or excusing human rights abuses that are 
occurring in a particular state.  This may take the form of well-meaning Westerners, 
8 BERTA ESPERANZA HERNÁNDEZ-TRUYOL ET AL., MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 8-9 
(2002); see also DONNELLY, supra note 2, at 99 (noting that U.S. President Clinton expressed great
indignation at the prospect of an American teenager being publicly caned in Singapore, without “find[ing] 
it even notable that in his own country people are being fried in the electric chair.”); see also Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-Na‘im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human 
Rights, in ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA‘IM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 38 (1992) 
(“[I]t is extremely important to be sensitive to the dangers of cultural imperialism, whether it is a product of
colonialism, a tool of international economic exploitation and political subjugation, or simply a product of 
extreme ethnocentricity.  Since we would not accept others imposing their moral standards on us, we 
should not impose our own moral standards on them.”).  
9 See, e.g., Michael McDonald, Reflections on Liberal Individualism, in AN-NA‘IM, supra note 8, at 155 
(“Often appeal to local shared understandings [in denouncing practices such as torture, slavery, and 
genocide] has the practical advantage of touching a government or political movement more deeply than an 
appeal to international standards [which] can be portrayed as alien and invasive, especially to collective 
autonomy.”); see also An-Na‘im, supra, note 8, at 20 (“[S]ince people are more likely to observe normative 
propositions if they believe them to be sanctioned by their own cultural traditions, observance of human 
rights standards can be improved through the enhancement of the cultural legitimacy of those standards.”).  
10 DONNELLY, supra note 2, at 100.
11
 Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of International 
Human Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 527, 586 (2001).  For example, it has been argued that “in the 
Rwandan genocide of 1994, it was not culture per se, but a political elite’s manipulation and exacerbation 
of preexisting socio-cultural divisions within Rwandan society that caused the systematic slaughter of 
Tutsi.” Id. at 587.
12 Id. at 587.
6aware of the largely negative legacy of Western colonialism, failing to criticize 
arguments advanced by non-Westerners “even when [those arguments] are inaccurate or 
morally absurd.”13  Or it may take the more vicious form of neglect or outright 
xenophobia, with an underlying attitude of “they’ve always been that way, why should 
we make any effort to change things now?”14
The anti-relativist, or universalist, stance is also strengthened by recognizing that 
relativist arguments are sometimes put forward by those cultures who would seem to 
need their protective value the least.15 For example, in the past the United States 
sometimes adopted a cultural relativist approach with regard to the juvenile death 
penalty, a practice widely recognized to be in violation of customary international law.16
Finally, Professor Donnelly argues with some force that in developing countries today, 
rather than “the persistence of traditional culture in the face of modern institutions . . . we 
usually see instead a disruptive and incomplete westernization, cultural confusion, or the 
enthusiastic embrace of ‘modern’ practices and values.  In other words, the traditional 
culture advanced to justify cultural relativism far too often no longer exists.”17
13 DONNELLY, supra note 2, at 100.
14 Cf. GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 284 (criticizing Western commentators who, observing the serious 
post-colonial problems in Zaire, “took cynical solace in the conviction that this state of affairs was about as 
authentic as Africa gets.  Leave the natives to their own devices, the thinking went, and – Voilà! – Zaire.  It 
was almost as if we wanted Zaire to be the Heart of Darkness; perhaps the nation suited our understanding 
of the natural order of nations.”); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roadmap:  Is the Marketplace Theory for 
Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 215, 238-39 (1998) (discussing “norm 
theory” and social science studies that demonstrate that “[w]e respond to persons in need according to how 
normal or abnormal their plight seems to us. Thus, famines in Biafra evoke little response because we think 
they are normal in that part of the world.”). 
15 See DONNELLY, supra note 2, at 99. 
16 See Universalism, Relativism, and Private Enforcement of Customary International Law, 5 CHI. J. INT'L 
L. 311, 315 (2004).  In fact, the Supreme Court recently held that the juvenile death penalty is 
unconstitutional, in part because of the “stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world 
that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”  Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 
1198 (2005).
17
 Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400, 410 (reprinted in 
DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:  LAW POLICY, AND PROCESS 216 (3D ED. 
2001)).
7B. Application of the Debate to War Crimes and War Crimes Prosecutions
1.  Cultural Relativism and War Crimes
As in other areas of human rights, cultural relativism issues lie at the heart of war 
crimes and war crimes prosecutions.  With respect to the crimes themselves, most 
scholars, including relativists, seem to agree that there are at least a small, core set of 
prohibitions that are universal.18  “Few today, for example, would resort to cultural 
relativism to defend cultural practices that sanction slavery, human sacrifice, or 
genocide.”19  Beyond this sense of agreement as to a small subset of crimes, however, the 
specifics of what acts are universally prohibited, and when, is seldom articulated.20
In fact, one commentator, David Chuter,21 has pointed out that there “there are 
few, if any, war crimes . . . that were not at some time regarded as permissible, if not 
actually praiseworthy, in various civilizations.”22  Moreover, Chuter argues that 
18 See, e.g. MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE xi (2002); see also id. 
at 66; Henry J. Richardson III, Book Review: Imperatives of Culture and Race for Understanding Human 
Rights Law: Human Rights:  A Political and Cultural Critique by Makau Mutua, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 511, 
514-15, 517 (2004).
19
 Sloane, supra note 11, at 583; see also David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 85, 126 n.145 (2004) (“[E]ven those inclined to embrace relativist positions on human rights never 
press their relativism to the point of overtly defending genocide or crimes against humanity.”)
20 See, e.g., An-Na‘im, supra note 8, at 21 (“[D]espite their apparent peculiarities and diversity, human 
beings and societies share certain fundamental interests, concerns, qualities, traits, and values that can be 
identified and articulated as the framework for a common ‘culture’ of universal human rights.  It would be 
premature in this exploratory essay to attempt to identify and articulate these interests, concerns, and so 
on, with certainty.”) (emphasis added); Donald W. Shriver, Jr. 16 J.L. & RELIGION 1,5 (2001) (arguing that 
there is an “emerging international consensus on the nature of ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity,’” 
but also noting that “[w]e are still in the midst of an international struggle to specify these categories [and] 
to give them legal definition . . . .”); MUTUA, supra note 18, at xi (“There are aspects of the official human 
rights corpus that I think are universal.  Prohibitions against genocide, slavery, and other basic 
abominations violate humanity at the core.  But beyond these obvious points of agreement, the ground 
becomes tricky.”) (emphasis added).
21
 Chuter works for the British Ministry of Defense, where he has had responsibility for Balkans war crimes 
issues and support to the ICTY.  See DAVID CHUTER, WAR CRIMES: CONFRONTING ATROCITY IN THE 
MODERN WORLD 299 (2003).
22 Id. at 10 (citing Deuteronomy 20:12-18); see also id. at 17 (“Killings, wife-stealing (the basic story in 
Homer’s Iliad), cattle-rustling, and the spoiling of crops were among the staples of intergroup relationships 
in earlier times, and there was no sense that any of these acts was wrong, provided it was directed at a 
member of the out-group.  Indeed, most heroic poetry (see Homer) praises deeds that today would be 
thought illegal as well as immoral.”).
8“international criminal justice [today] has a heavily Western, white, Anglo-Saxon 
character,” and that its “vocabulary and concepts are not neutral [but instead] are 
culturally specific, constructed and manipulated by a very small number of countries, 
most of which have English as their native or second language.”23  Chuter therefore 
concludes that international humanitarian law does not embody universal values, but 
rather “is in part a form of neocolonialism, in the sense that it gives the West practical 
leverage to achieve political objectives such as the replacement of rulers or regimes.”24
Even the term “war crimes” is problematic.  In this paper, I use the term generally 
to refer to all of the crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of international criminal 
tribunals, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.  As such, it is 
useful shorthand, but it can also be confusing and deceptive, and inevitably means 
different things in different contexts.25  In fact, “each successive international court has 
tended to define the categories of war crimes and crimes against humanity with new 
components or variations . . . .”26
Moreover, the crimes that do fall under this broad umbrella are international 
crimes only because of the context in which they take place.  In other words, rape is rape, 
and murder is murder, but sometimes they are violations of international law and 
23 Id. at 94.  Chuter specifically argues that international humanitarian norms reflect Western biases in their 
focus on individual guilt, imputation of command responsibility, and demand that soldiers disobey 
unlawful orders.  Id. at 96-97. Chuter also notes that “[n]one of the major players in the international 
humanitarian law game can dictate to others from a position of complete moral superiority: all have done 
things comparable to some of the atrocities of Rwanda and Yugoslavia in modern times, or they have 
excused similar behavior on the part of their allies.  Likewise, all have blocked, or attempted to block, 
investigations by international authorities into their own conduct more recently.”  Id. at 95. 
24 Id. at 95. 
25 See id. at 3 (noting that the expression ‘war crimes’ “needs to be used with great care.  Neither the 
[ICTY] nor the [ICTR] tribunals punish war crimes – they punish serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.  Confusingly, the Statute of the [ICC] does refer to war crimes, but in a context that is 
describing what was called Violations of the Laws or Customs of War or Grave Breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions in the past.  It is a mistake to assume that war crimes are a conceptual category all their own.”)
26
 Patricia M. Wald, Reflections on Judging: At Home and Abroad, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 219, 235 (2004).
9sometimes not.  In general, it depends on whether they take place during an “armed 
conflict” or in a situation where the violence is “widespread and systematic” in nature: all 
inquires that are somewhat subjective.27  Finally, within the context of an armed conflict, 
it is typically the character of the victim as a civilian or other non-combatant that makes a 
certain act a crime, and there is often “a degree of subjectivity” in the definitions of 
combatants and non-combatants.28
Thus several levels of contextual nuance surround the definition of war crimes –
all of which will be impacted by the cultural viewpoints of, inter alia, the victims, 
perpetrators, judges, and others who create and interpret international humanitarian law.  
It is therefore unsurprising that cultural relativism arguments also play a large role in 
determining the appropriate response to war crimes when they occur, particularly the 
response by the international community.  
2.  Cultural Relativism and Responses to War Crimes
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community and particularly the 
United Nations has begun to respond more and more often to the occurrence of war 
crimes throughout the world.  In many cases, that international response has taken the 
27 See, e.g., CHUTER, supra note 21, at 77-78 (“violations of the laws or customs of war, as well as grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, require an armed conflict of some kind if they are to be charged.  . . .  
[The ICTY’s] statute requires it to prove the existence of an armed conflict first before crimes against 
humanity can be charged.  (This stipulation is not found in the statute for the [ICTR] or in the ICC 
Statute.)”); id. at 214-15 (the requirement of an armed conflict “has been dropped in the ICC Statute . . . 
[b]ut the other requirement for the proof of crimes against humanity is that the atrocities should be 
‘widespread and systematic,’ which is to say that random atrocities, even conduced on a large scale and 
very brutally, would not qualify unless there were an underlying plan of some kind.”); see also Richard H. 
Pildes, Conflicts Between American and European Views of Law: The Dark Side of Legalism, 44 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 145, 160 (2003) (“[J]udging individual acts of criminal responsibility always presupposes some 
normative context, but in many cases involving alleged war crimes, it is that very context that is the subject 
of dispute.  As soon as the law tries to assess that larger historical and political context, the law moves into 
areas of indeterminacy and political conflict.”).
28
 For example, “[a]ny troops sent into Rwanda in 1994 to ‘stop the genocide’ would have found 
themselves firing on women and children, who made up a substantial proportion of the Hutu killers.”  
CHUTER, supra note 21, at 78. 
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form of the establishment of an international legal tribunal.  First, in 1993 the United 
Nations Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in response to atrocities in the Balkans during the various conflicts 
in that region.29  Then in 1994, the Security Council created the ICTR in response to the 
Rwandan genocide of that same year.30  In addition, several “hybrid” courts, combining 
national and international judges and law, have also been established or discussed – most 
notably in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and Cambodia.31  Finally, the long-awaited 
International Criminal Court (ICC), the first ever permanent, treaty based international 
criminal court, was established in July 1998, and the Rome Statute governing the 
jurisdiction and functioning of the court entered into force in July 2002.32
Yet if “[l]aw is a form of cultural expression and is not readily transplantable 
from one culture to another,”33 then the creation of international criminal tribunals will 
necessarily have implications for the cultural relativism debate.  The concept of 
29 See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 28, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1994), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/098/21/IMG/N9309821.pdf?OpenElement (deciding in 
principle to establish the tribunal); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 29, U.N. Doc S/INF/49 (1994), 
available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/306/28/IMG/N9330628.pdf?OpenElement 
(adopting the Statute of the tribunal); see also 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 30-31 (1998); Ivana Nizich, International Law 
Weekend Proceedings:  International Tribunals and Their Ability to Provide Adequate Justice: Lessons 
from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 353, 353 (2001).
30 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (1996), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/140/97/PDF/N9514097.pdf?OpenElement; see also 1 
MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 72; Nizich, supra note 29, at 353.
31 See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Accountability for War Crimes: What Roles for National, International and 
Hybrid Tribunals?, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 192, 192 (2004); Nsongurua J. Udombana, Globalization 
of Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s War Crimes, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 55 (2003); Laura 
A. Dickinson, The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts and International Courts: The Case of Kosovo, 37 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1059. 1059, 1070-71 (2003); Laura A. Dickerson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 
AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 296-300 (2003).
32 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 
available in 37 I.L.M. 999 (entered into force July 1, 2002); see also International Criminal Court, About 
the Court, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html.
33 MARY ANN GLENDON, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 10 (1982); see also 
Note, Kristina D. Rutledge, “Spoiling Everything” – But for Whom?  Rules of Evidence and International 
Criminal Proceedings, 16 REGENT U.L. REV. 151 (2004).
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“universal” jurisdiction over war crimes is largely accepted and “there is a remarkable 
degree of consensus among international lawyers in favor of international criminal 
accountability for mass murderers, rapists, and torturers.”34  There is also, however, a 
healthy body of scholarship that argues that purely “outsider” prosecution is a flawed 
response to war crimes.  
For example, in critiquing the international community’s response to the 
Rwandan genocide, including the establishment of the ICTR, Professor Jose Alvarez has 
argued that “the international community needs to be responsive to the idiosyncratic 
conditions that gave rise to massive violations of human rights as well as to the 
conditions prevailing in those societies in the immediate wake of atrocities.” 35  Professor 
Alvarez asserts that his critique “is not premised on cultural relativism”36; however, he 
does admit that there may be “idiosyncratic cultural or historical reasons why Rwandans 
or other groups may resist solutions designed or imposed by the international 
community,” and he agrees that some of those reasons are suggested by his analysis.37
Similarly, in an analysis of the effectiveness of both the ICTR and the ICTY, 
Ivana Nizich, a former intelligence analyst and research officer for the ICTY, has opined 
that “[t]he international community cannot have an elitist, paternalistic attitude toward 
[war] crimes and toward the victims of these crimes, i.e., viewing local participation as 
inherently biased, tribal, inexperienced, and inept.”38  Nizich also argues that “hybrid 
attempt[s] to fuse international and national participation in adjudicating war crimes may, 
34
 Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate:  Lessons from Rwanda 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 366 
(1999).
35 See id. at 370 (emphasis added). The Rwandan situation and the ICTR are discussed in greater detail in 
Part III, infra.
36 See id. at 369.
37 Id. 
38
 Nizich, supra note 29, at 364.
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in some cases, be preferable [to] the ‘elitist’ models (i.e., the ICTY and ICTR).”39  Again, 
though not specifically using the language of cultural relativism, the subtext to this 
argument is that the hybrid tribunals will better understand and reflect cultural values and 
be less prone to the moral imperialism dangers of a radical universalist approach.
Finally, Professor Mark Drumbl has argued that “although all genocides are 
among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,” 
nevertheless, “each genocide is unique . . . [and] the modalities of securing accountability 
and encouraging healing should vary in each individual case.”40  Professor Drumbl thus 
argues that policy responses to war crimes should be based on a “contextual approach” 
rather than a “deontological approach . . . [that] posits that trials of selected individuals 
(preferably undertaken at the international level) constitute the favored and often 
exclusive remedy to respond to all situations of genocide and crimes against humanity.”41
Although he hesitates to specifically invoke the language of cultural relativism,42
Professor Drumbl clearly embraces at least some aspects of the theory, arguing that 
“[p]rocesses based on local culture and regional practice may create a greater sense of 
familiarity among victims than the potentially alienating procedure of trials.”43  Thus the 
39 Id. at 363.  I return to the advantages of hybrid tribunals in Part IV, infra.  
40
 Mark Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1221, 1224 (2000); see also Mark Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The 
Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 548 (2005) (“[I]nterpretations of justice are often 
multi-layered and, for many people, take root in national and local contexts.”)
41
 Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide, supra note 40, at 1228.
42 See, e.g., Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment, supra note 40, at 603 (“Cultural 
relativism should not impede the establishment of a system-wide norm that holds accountable those 
individuals who perpetrate acts of great wickedness.  There is no culture that views the infliction of such 
acts as tolerable.”)
43
 Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide, supra note 40, at 1265; see also Drumbl, Collective Violence and 
Individual Punishment, supra note 40, at 548-49, 610 (“[A]t a minimum, some space should be retained in 
this accountability process for alternative (and perhaps competing) mechanisms, such as those that draw 
from local custom, national practices, or indigenous legal process.  . . .  I propose . . . that international 
criminal law and punishment contemplate communitarian underpinnings, in which international norms 
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subtext of cultural relativism is present, and should be recognized, in this and other 
debates about the relative value of international versus domestic responses to war crimes.
3. Cultural Relativism Within International War Crimes Prosecutions
As this discussion illustrates, the response to war crimes that reflects the most 
“universalist” approach is that of an international war crimes tribunal such as the ICTY or 
ICTR.  Nonetheless, even given a decision to address war crimes through the use of an 
international prosecutorial body, there may still be room for cultural sensitivity in how 
that body goes about doing justice.
Of course, one could argue that the philosophy underlying international war 
crimes prosecutions is diametrically opposed to the idea of cultural relativism.  For 
example, Justice Richard Goldstone, the former Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY and 
ICTR, has called cultural relativism “a dangerous trend” and has argued that it should 
play no role in war crimes prosecutions.44  Indeed, we would be appalled if an 
international war crimes tribunal judged the architect of a genocide in Africa differently 
from the architect of a genocide in Europe on the basis that the African defendant’s 
actions reflected a part of his “culture” with which the international community should 
not interfere. 
Yet at the same time, culture – and cultural differences – have been and will 
continue to be an undeniable fact of life for all parties involved with international 
tribunals.  International tribunals typically consist of legal officers (judges, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, and staff) who come from different cultures than the defendant and/or 
become sedimentarily integrated into communities in a manner that takes into account cultural needs 
instead of imposing cultural values.”)
44
 Justice Richard Goldstone, Symposium:  Prosecuting International Crimes:  An Inside View, 7 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11 (1997). 
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victims.45  As Judge Patricia Wald has noted with respect to the ICTY, “[The ICTY] tries 
suspects in a country to which they have no ties and sentences them to prison in other 
foreign countries.  To many internationalists this may reflect a triumph, but there are also 
voices urging caution.  . . .  Our judicial systems, with their peculiar rights and remedies, 
are products and reflections of our unique political and cultural notions.”46 If 
international legal officers refuse to acknowledge this reality, and instead simply judge 
the witnesses, facts, and defendant’s behavior solely based on their own cultural norms, it 
is less likely that justice will result.  We would therefore want these judges to 
acknowledge and consider cultural differences as they proceed.  
Thus one could accept the universal validity and application of certain war 
crimes, but nonetheless see a role for cultural sensitivity in how an international war 
crimes tribunal operates.  To return to Professor Donnelly’s thesis, cultural relativism 
arguments can apply to either the substance of human rights, the interpretation of 
particular rights, and/or the form in which those rights are implemented.47  One could, for 
example, advocate a universalist position with respect to a substantive list of human 
rights (e.g., protection against genocide), but also allow culture-based deviations from 
international norms at the level of interpretation (e.g., how genocide is defined in a 
particular situation) or at the level of form and implementation (e.g., how a tribunal goes 
about investigating and prosecuting an alleged genocide).
45 For example, Professor Drumbl notes that the ICTR prosecutions are “held in Tanzania, . . . where the 
language of the trial may not be understandable to all Rwandans, . . . [and] where the trials may be 
encumbered by foreign (and seemingly technical) procedures.”  Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide, supra 
note 40, at 1259.  I return to a discussion of the specific impact that cultural or language differences have 
had at the ICTR in Part III, infra.  
46
 Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some 
Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemma of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 87, 117 (2001).
47 See DONNELLY, supra note 2, at 90, 96-98.
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III. Cultural Relativism and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
With these general observations in mind, it will be helpful at this point to apply 
them to a specific case study.  The ICTR is an ideal subject for this study, because several 
aspects of the cultural relativism debate have resonated throughout the Rwandan 
experience.  Moreover, the Tribunal has considered cultural differences in the course of 
fulfilling its mandate, thus illustrating the importance of these issues even when operating 
within an universalist framework.  
A. History of the Rwandan Genocide and the Establishment of the ICTR
1. Rwandan History Through 1994
The history leading up to the Rwandan genocide is well documented elsewhere.48
However, a brief recitation of the relevant facts here – with special emphasis on the role 
that the international community played in these events – will assist us in evaluating the 
relevance of cultural relativism to the establishment and work of the ICTR.
On April 6, 1994, the Rwandan President, Juvénal Habyarimana, was killed when 
his plane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile.49  This incident sparked the 
widespread and systematic murder of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 civilians – mostly 
Tutsis – throughout the country.50  When the violence subsided, more than 75% of 
Rwandan’s ethnic Tutsi population had been slaughtered.51  The scale of the violence was 
unprecedented: the murders occurred at almost three times the rate of the killing of Jews 
48 See generally, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 1; GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS: HISTORY OF A 
GENOCIDE (1995); 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 47.
49 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 47.
50 See id.  
51 See id.
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during the Holocaust.52  Yet this genocide was not a spontaneous uprising, nor the 
inevitable result of ancient tribal warfare.  It was carefully planned, and, most agree, fully 
preventable by the international community.53
Rwanda is composed primarily of two “ethnic” groups: the Hutu majority and the 
Tutsi minority.54  Yet these two groups historically “spoke the same language, followed 
the same religion, intermarried, and lived intermingled, without territorial distinctions . . . 
sharing the same social and political culture in small chiefdoms.”55  In fact, because of 
the great degree of intermixing throughout the years, ethnographers and historians 
question whether the Tutsi and Hutu are in fact distinct ethnic groups.56  Rather, the main 
historic distinction between the two groups was economic:  “Hutus were cultivators and 
Tutsis were herdsmen.”57  Because being a herdsman was a more prosperous vocation, 
the minority Tutsi eventually emerged as an aristocratic elite; however, the lines between 
the two groups remained porous.58
Nevertheless, when European colonizers arrived in Rwanda at the end of the 
nineteenth century, they quickly seized on real or perceived differences between the two 
52 See id. at 47 & n.215 (citing Philip Gourevitch, After the Genocide, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 1995, at 
78, and Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 501, 501 (1996)).
53 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 48.  But see CHUTER, supra note 21, at 123-24 (criticizing the 
post hoc calls for intervention in Rwanda as unrealistic).
54 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 48.  A third ethnic group, the Twa, comprise approximately 
2% of the Rwandan population.  Id. at 48 n.221.
55 GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 47.  Although the Tutsis are generally described as tall and lanky, with 
aquiline noses and longer jawbones, and the Hutus as stocky, dark-skinned, and round-faced, “[n]ature 
presents countless exceptions.”  Id. at 50.  Moreover, intermarriage was common, and “through marriage 
and clientage, Hutus could become hereditary Tutsis, and Tutsis could become hereditary Hutus.”  Id.  See 
also 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 48-49.
56 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 49; see also GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 48 (stating that 
“ethnographers and historians have lately come to agree that Hutus and Tutsis cannot properly be called 
distinct ethnic groups.”)
57 GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 48; see also 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 49.
58 GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 48; see also 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 49.
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groups in order to further their own brand of “race science.”59  As Phillip Gourevitch 
describes it in his history of the Rwandan genocide:
[W]hen the Europeans arrived in Rwanda at the end of the 
nineteenth century, they formed a picture of a stately race 
of warrior kings, surrounded by herds of long-horned cattle 
and a subordinate race of short, dark peasants, hoeing 
tubers and picking bananas.  The white men assumed that 
this was the tradition of the place, and they thought it a 
natural arrangement.60
Thus to conform reality to their vision of it, the colonizers encouraged and deepened the 
divide between the two groups.  The Germans and then the Belgians set up a policy of 
indirect colonial rule, with the Tutsis serving as feudal lords on the Europeans’ behalf.61
The Belgians also furthered the division of Hutu and Tutsi by “conduct[ing] a census for 
the purpose of issuing identity cards which labeled every Rwandan as a Hutu, a Tutsi, or 
a Twa.”62  A person’s classification was based on patrilineal lineage, and membership in 
a particular group became increasingly rigid.63
Naturally, the majority Hutu population resented the assumption of Tutsi 
superiority and the imposition of Tutsi rule by the Europeans.64  After World War II, as 
independence movements spread throughout Africa, the Belgians began to sympathize 
with the Hutus desire for self-determination.65  The Hutus therefore seized power in 
Rwanda in 1959,66 and the first wave of systematic political violence between Hutus and 
59 See id. at 50; see also 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 49.
60 GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 50.
61 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 49; see also GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 54.
62 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 49.
63 See id. at 49-50.
64 See GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 57-58.
65 See id. at 58.
66 See GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 58; 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 50.
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Tutsis followed.  During the next few years, over 100,000 Tutsis fled the country in the 
face of mass killings.67
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Rwanda was a dictatorship ruled by the French-
supported President Habyarimana, and France brought the country within its “neocolonial 
sphere in Francophone Africa.”68  During this same time period, the exiled Tutsis 
attempted several times to invade Rwanda and overthrow the government.  After each 
unsuccessful attempt, Tutsis in Rwanda would be massacred by the thousands.69
In 1990, the largely Tutsi refugee army known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) attacked again, and France responded by sending arms to Rwanda and providing a 
contingent of troops to fight with the Rwandan army.70  In late 1992, the fighting between 
the Rwandan army and the RPF forces reached a stalemate, and the two camps began 
negotiating a series of agreements that culminated in the August 1993 Arusha peace 
accords.71  “[C]rucially, throughout the peace-implementation period a United Nations 
peacekeeping force would be deployed in Rwanda.”72
Hutu extremists, many of whom were close to President Habyarimana, were 
strongly opposed to the peace agreement, even as Hutu moderate opposition parties 
gained increasing support among the Rwandan population.73  To shore up his support 
among the Hutus, President Habyarimana soon sought to again unite them against “a 
67 See GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 59; 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 50.
68 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 50.
69 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 50. The British philosopher Sir Bertrand Russell described 
the scene in Rwanda in 1964 as “the most horrible and systematic massacre we have had occasion to 
witness since the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis.” GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 65.
70 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 50; GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 88.  France continued to 
funnel huge arms shipments into Rwanda “right through the killings in 1994 . . . .” GOUREVITCH, supra
note 1, at 89.  Gourevitch also notes that “[i]nitially, Belgium and Zaire also sent groups to back up 
[Habyarimana’s forces], but the Zaireans were so given to drinking, looting, and raping that Rwanda soon 
begged them to go home, and the Belgians withdrew of their own accord.”  Id. 
71 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 50-51; GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 99.
72 GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 99.
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common enemy”: the Tutsis.74  In 1993, a training camp for the “Hutu militia” was 
established, providing groups of 300 Hutus at a time with courses “on methods of mass 
murder and indoctrination in ethnic hatred.”75  The Rwandan authorities distributed six 
million dollars worth of firearms provided by France to militia members and other 
Habyarimana supporters; in addition, “machetes were imported en masse from China and 
stored in secret caches throughout the country.”76
In early 1994, the commander of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Rwanda 
(UNAMIR), Major General Romeo Dallaire, sent a cable to the U.N. Headquarters 
warning that the Hutu hard-liners were planning a genocidal massacre of the Tutsis.77  In 
the weeks following, he made repeated requests for reinforcements and sought 
authorization to use force to seize the weapons caches, but U.N. officials – still stinging 
from the death of U.S. soldiers in peacekeeping operations in Somalia – refused these 
requests.78
This set the stage for the mass genocide that began in April 1994.  Almost 
instantly after Habyarimana was assassinated, Hutu soldiers and the newly trained militia 
began to hunt down and kill Tutsi civilians and moderate Hutus.79  Barricades were 
erected on major thoroughfares, at which members of the Hutu Presidential Guard 
inspected identity cards and executed those who had a Tutsi identity card or were 
73 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 51.
74 Id. (quoting Gourevitch, After the Genocide, supra note 52, at 86.)
75 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 52; see also Final Report of the Commission of Experts 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), para. 65 (reprinted in 2 VIRGINIA MORRIS 
& MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 150, 160 (1998)).  
76 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 52.  
77 See id. at 52-53; GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 103-05.
78 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 53; GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 105-06.
79 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 53.
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perceived to have Tutsi Physical traits.80  Tutsis were hunted down and killed through 
house-to-house searches, and Tutsis who sought refuge at churches or hotels were often 
surrounded by soldiers and massacred.81  Hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were 
murdered, and tens of thousands of Tutsi women were raped and/or sexually mutilated.82
In the meantime, Belgium withdrew from the U.N. Peacekeeping force after a 
contingent of ten Belgian United Nations Peacekeepers were captured, tortured, and 
murdered.83  On April 21, 1994, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution that 
ordered the retreat of all but 270 U.N. Peacekeeping troops.84  The United States not only 
sought to avoid involvement with peacekeeping missions but also urged others not to 
undertake missions that it wished to avoid.85  When other countries began pushing for the 
return of U.N. troops, the United States demanded control of the mission and then 
encouraged delays in the deployment of troops on the Security Council.86
At the same time, French diplomats were depicting the massacre as a “mass 
popular outrage” in response to the President’s assassination.87  France also encouraged 
the view that that the killing was an extension of the war with the RPF, and that the RPF 
was either the greater offender, or that at most a two-way genocide was taking place: “in 
short, that Rwandans were simply killing each other as they were wont to do, for 
primordial tribal reasons, since time immemorial.”88  France also launched Operation 
80 See id. at 54; see also Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 75, at para. 69. 
81 See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 75, at paras. 69-72.
82 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 55.
83 See GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 114, 150.
84 GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 150.
85 See id.  
86 See id. at 151.
87 Id. at 154.
88 Id. at 154; see also id. at 156.
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Tourquoise, which the Security Counsel endorsed and gave permission to use force.89
(By a strange coincidence, the Rwandan government occupied a rotating seat on the 
Security Council at this time.90)  Operation Turquoise set up a “safe zone”  in 
southwestern Rwanda, but many asked “safe for whom?”91  The operation did rescue at 
least 10,000 Tutsis, but thousands more were killed in the zone under France’s control.92
The Hutu government even moved its radio station into the French zone and continued to 
broadcast incitements to kill Tutsis.93
Nevertheless, by mid-July, the RPF had pushed its way to the capital, and 
hundreds of thousands of Hutus had fled into Southwest Rwanda and Zaire (now the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo).94  On July 18, the Hutu extremist government fled 
the country and the RPF established a new coalition government with the surviving 
members of the anti-Hutu Power opposition parties.95  Thus the genocide ended, but 
Rwanda was left with hundreds of thousands dead and wounded, and hundreds of 
thousands of murderers and accomplices.
2.  After the Genocide: The International Community’s Response
The international community had failed to prevent or stop the genocide, but it 
nevertheless quickly turned to the question of what it might do to help bring the 
perpetrators to justice.96  The Rwandan penal system had been completely decimated,97
89 Id. at 155-56.
90 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 60.
91 GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 157.
92 See id. at 158.
93 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 61.
94 See GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 162.  Those fleeing included many who had been responsible for the 
killings.  See id. at 156.  They “were indiscriminately received with open arms by U.N. and humanitarian 
agencies and accommodated as refugees in giant camps.”  Id; see also 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, 
at 60.
95 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 58; GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 162.
96 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 61.
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and the new government – which now occupied the Rwandan seat on the Security 
Council – began pressing for a war crimes tribunal similar to the ICTY, set up the 
pervious year.98
However, many on the Security Council were resistant to the idea of a “costly 
international investigation and a tribunal which the United Nations could ill-afford.”99
Such resistance was harshly criticized, and some suggested that it smacked of racism.100
As one commentator noted:
[H]ad the sequence of events between the Yugoslav and 
Rwanda conflicts been different, it is by no means certain 
that a tribunal for Rwanda would have been established. On 
the basis of international responses to other situations, it 
has been suggested that the plight of African victims would 
not generate the same outcry as the suffering of Europeans. 
In other words, the Rwanda Tribunal was established [only] 
because of the precedential effect of the Yugoslav 
Tribunal.101
Or as the Prime Minister-delegate of the new Rwandan coalition government asked, 
“Was a war crimes court not set up in Germany?  Is it because we’re Africans that a court 
has not been set up [for Rwanda]?”102
Thus in November 1994 the Security Council established the ICTR.103 In a 
strange turn of events, however, Rwanda was the only member of the Security Council to 
97 See Jose Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu Judgment, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 359, 369 (1999) 
(noting that, after the genocide, there were “sixteen lawyers left alive” in Rwanda); see also Nicole Fritz & 
Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 391, 406 (2001) (noting that “the genocide in Rwanda left the judicial system 
virtually destroyed – approximately ninety-five percent of the country’s lawyers and judges were killed, 
exiled, or imprisoned.”).  
98 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 62.
99 Id. 
100 See id. 
101
 Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of 
Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501, 501 (1996).
102 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 62.
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vote against the Resolution that created the Tribunal.104  Although it had initially 
requested its creation, as negotiations progressed Rwanda objected to a number of the 
provisions in the Tribunal’s governing statute.105  First, Rwanda objected because the 
ICTR would have jurisdiction only over crimes committed during the 1994 calendar 
year,106 which would prevent the ICTR from fully investigating the activities that led up 
to the genocide.107  Second, Rwanda objected that the ICTR would be understaffed and 
underfunded, with only a handful of judges and with the appellate body and chief 
prosecutor to be split between the ICTR and the ICTY.108  Third, Rwanda objected to the 
fact that the seat of the court would be in Tanzania rather than Rwanda, which would 
make it more difficult for the Rwandan people to follow the court’s proceedings.109
Finally, Rwanda objected to the fact that the Tribunal’s statute prohibits the 
imposition of the death penalty.110  This objection was tied to the fact that the ICTR was 
never expected to try more than a handful of defendants, and that it would focus on the 
regime elites who had the greatest role in organizing and executing and the genocidal 
plan.111  Because the Rwandan Penal Code does provide for the death penalty, “[t]hose 
most responsible for the killings” would not face the death penalty, while lower-level 
perpetrators tried in the Rwandan courts might be executed.112  Similarly, Rwanda argued 
103 See id. at 72; see also Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8, 1994, S.C. Res. 955, 
Annex, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc S/INF/50 (1996), reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra
note 75, at 3.
104 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 72.
105 See Madeline H. Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF 
NUREMBERG 211 (Belia Cooper, Ed.) (1999).
106 See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 103, at art. 7.  
107 See Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide, supra note 105.
108 See id.
109 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 68.
110 See Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide, supra note 105.
111 See CHUTER, supra note 21, at 221.
112 Id.
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that the prison terms for those convicted at the Tribunal should be served in Rwanda, “not 
in some posh facility in Europe.”113
These specific disputes also reflected Rwanda’s broader frustration with the 
international community.  Many felt that Rwanda needed international assistance to fit its 
unique situation, but instead the international community applied a “cookie-cutter” 
approach by establishing a tribunal that was “essentially a weaker, more impoverished 
replica” of the ICTY.114  Moreover, whereas at the time of the establishment of the ICTY 
there was little reason to expect serious local prosecutions of war crimes perpetrators, the 
situation with Rwanda was different: “local authorities were willing to prosecute and 
could have used extensive international assistance to make such efforts more credible.”115
Instead, international resources that could have gone to rebuild the shattered Rwandan 
justice system were diverted to the ICTR.116  Thus some have argued that the existence of 
the ICTR is more a reflection of “internationalist priorities” than a genuine response to 
the needs of the Rwandan victims.117
B. Cultural Relativism and the Rwandan Experience
This history – both of the Rwandan genocide and of the establishment of the 
ICTR – illustrates several of the issues in the universalist/cultural relativist debate 
113 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 68; see also CHUTER, supra note 21, at 221 (“[P]risons that 
house convicted criminals indicted by the ad hoc tribunals have to meet minimum U.N. standards, and 
these standards are often higher than average Africans would expect in their private homes.”); see also 
Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment, supra note 40, at 579 (noting also that many 
victims as well as perpetrators of the violence in Rwanda are HIV-positive, and that prisoners of the ICTR 
have access to medical care that is not available to most of the victims).  
114
 Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu Judgment, supra note 97, at 369-70.  Gourevitch quotes one 
Rwandan diplomat as saying that “We asked for help to catch these people who ran away and to try them 
properly in our own courts . . . [but instead] the Security Council just stared writing ‘Rwanda’ under the 
name ‘Yugoslavia’ everywhere.”  GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 252.
115
 Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu Judgment, supra note 97, at 370.
116 See id. (stating that resources “reaching between $40 and $50 million a year” were going to the 
international tribunal).
117 Id. at 370.  
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discussed supra.  In fact, both universalists and cultural relativists can find support for 
their positions in these facts.
1. The Universalist Response
First, a universalist could point out that certain real or perceived elements of 
Rwandan “culture” appear to have contributed to the genocide.  For example, Rwandans 
and non-Rwandans alike often speak of the “culture of impunity” that prevailed prior to 
1994.118  Although this is more in the nature of rhetoric – meaning simply that 
perpetrators of previous abuses had gone unpunished – than an assertion of an actual 
“cultural” value, the use of the word is nonetheless telling.  Moreover, there does in fact 
appear to have been a cultural norm that encouraged inter-ethnic violence in Rwanda, 
especially when that violence was orchestrated and ordered by community leaders.119
This aspect of Rwandan society is sometimes referred to as a “culture of obedience”:120
[T]here had always been a strong tradition of unquestioning 
obedience to authority in the pre-colonial kingdom of 
Rwanda.  This tradition was of course reinforced by both 
the German and the Belgian colonial administrations.  And 
since independence the country has lived under a well-
organized tightly-controlled state.  When the highest 
authorities in that state told you to do something you did it, 
even if it included killing.121
To the extent that these can be considered “cultural” values or traits, a universalist 
approach would argue – correctly – that these traits are not worthy of protection.  
118 See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The 
Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 325, 333 
(1997).
119 See GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 123 (“During the genocide, the work of the killers was not regarded 
as a crime in Rwanda; it was effectively the law of the land, and every citizen was responsible for its 
administration.”).
120
 Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation, supra note 118, at 335.  
121 Id. (quoting GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS:  HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 244-45 (1995)); see also 
Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment, supra note 40, at 568 (“[I]n certain circumstances, 
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In addition, as illustrated by the history of Rwanda discussed supra, Rwanda is an 
example of “disruptive and incomplete westernization [and] cultural confusion,” and thus 
cultural relativism arguments have less force when applied to modern Rwandan 
culture.122  Indeed, the supposedly ancient “tribal” conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi in 
Rwanda are directly rooted in the legacy of colonialism, and until “1959 there had never 
been systematic political violence recorded between Hutus and Tutsis – anywhere.”123
As one scholar has pointed out, the “simplistic ‘tribal war thesis’ is often a reflection of 
ethnocentrism, if not an expedient absolution from apathy in the face of immense human 
suffering.”124  This version of “ethnocentrism” thus reflects one aspect of the “negative 
face” of cultural relativism – the outsider dismissing human rights abuses on the grounds 
that “that’s just their culture, so there’s nothing that we can do about it.”
Similarly, with respect to the establishment of the ICTR, the universalism 
argument directs our attention to the admonitions by Rwandans and others that genocide 
in African is just as worthy of international adjudication as is genocide in Europe.  
Indeed, we must avoid cultural relativism arguments in cases where such arguments are 
nothing more than a way for the international community - particularly the West - to 
avoid responding to horrors that take place in cultures that do not more closely resemble 
our own.  
2. The Cultural Relativist Response
However, the history of Rwanda and the establishment of the ICTR provides 
support for cultural relativism arguments as well.  Cultural relativism is – at least in part 
those who commit extraordinary international crimes are the ones conforming to social norms whereas 
those who refuse to commit the crimes choose to act deviantly.”)  
122
 Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, supra note 17, at 410.
123 GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 59.
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– a response to colonialism and the harm that comes from outside (particularly 
“Western”) influences in another culture.  Given the fact that the Tutsi/Hutu distinction 
and ultimate conflict was largely furthered through Western influence - based on then-
current notions of race and ethnicity - Rwanda would be justified in resisting further 
impositions of Western values, even if those values are now couched in terms of 
assistance rather than conquest.  Moreover, given the failure of the international 
community to prevent or stop the genocide, as well as the cooperation of some Western 
states with the regime that perpetrated the genocide, Rwanda would be correct to greet 
any new offer of Western help with skepticism.  
In addition, elements of moral imperialism (the “negative face” of universalism) 
can be found in the Security Council’s decision to create the ICTR in spite of the 
objections by the post-genocide Rwandan government.  This decision may reflect the 
perception “that the Rwandan judiciary was incapable of reaching just verdicts,” and that 
“any trials that Rwanda might hold [would be] beneath international standards.”125  This 
perception is furthered by the fact that the ICTR has “primary” jurisdiction in any case 
that fits under its mandate, meaning that it may require Rwandan (or other) domestic 
courts to relinquish any defendant falling under its mandate to its jurisdiction.126  While 
this does not necessarily reflect insensitivity to specific Rwandan cultural values, it does 
imply that the international community is a better judge of Rwandan events than are 
Rwandans.  This is (1) questionable, in light of the international community’s actions 
leading up to and during the genocide; and (2) dangerous, as it may encourage the 
124
 Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation, supra note 118, at 328.  
125 GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 252-53.
126 See, e.g., Madeline H. Morris, Rwandan Justice and the International Criminal Court, 5 ILSA J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 351, 354 (1999).
28
perception of Rwanda as lawless, tribal, or primitive (a perception that universalists 
would also seek to avoid).  
C. The Role of Culture in ICTR Trials and Decisions 
Thus by looking at Rwanda through the lens of the universalist/cultural relativist 
debate, we can see that there are truths – and dangers – in both lines of thought.  I next 
turn to the question of what role, if any, cultural sensitivity does or should play in the 
operation of the Tribunal.  As demonstrated by several cases issued by the Tribunal, I 
believe that it has appropriately adopted a “mild” cultural relativist approach in its 
operations, and that it has endeavored, where appropriate, to recognize and take into 
account differences in the Rwandan culture when recognition of those differences has 
assisted the Tribunal to do justice.
1. Cultural and Language Factors Affecting Witness Testimony
Several ICTR decisions have noted the difficulty of receiving and interpreting 
testimony from witnesses whose culture and language is foreign to the Tribunal Judges’ 
own.  The first case to discuss this issue was The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, in which the 
Trial Chamber found the former Bourgmestre (mayor) of Taba guilty of genocide, direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity, and sentenced 
him to life in prison.127
In assessing the evidence against Mr. Akayesu, the Trial Chamber specifically 
considered “cultural factors which might affect an understanding of the evidence 
127 See the Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, (1998) available at 1998 WL 1782077; see also Cecile 
E.M. Meijer, The War Crimes Research Office Presents: News from the International Criminal Tribunal, 9 
NO. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 30 (2004), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/09/3tribunals
.cfm#6101.
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presented.”128  Some of these difficulties stemmed from the fact that most of the 
witnesses spoke Kinyarwanda.  For example, the Trial Chamber noted that there appeared 
to be contradictions between the testimony of several witnesses on the stand and earlier 
statements by these same witnesses given to Tribunal investigators.129  The Trial 
Chamber explained these inconsistencies, in part, by noting that “the interpretation of oral 
testimony of witnesses from Kinyarwanda into one of the official languages of the 
tribunal [French and English] has been a particularly great challenge due to the fact that 
the syntax and everyday modes of expression in the Kinyarwanda language are complex 
and difficult to translate into French or English.”130  These difficulties, the Tribunal 
reasoned, affected the pre-trial interviews as well as the interpretation of in-court 
testimony.131
The Trial Chamber also noted that certain Kinyarwanda terms were infused with 
special meaning that could only be understood within the context of the Rwandan culture.  
For example, the basic meaning of the term Inyenzi is “cockroach.”132  However, the term 
had also been used to refer to the incursions of Tutsi refugees since the 1960s,133 and it 
was later used by anti-Tutsi extremist media to refer to all Tutsis.134  Similarly, the term 
128 Akayesu, supra note 127, at para. 130.
129 See id. at para. 140.
130 Id. at para. 145.  
131 See id.  Although not mentioned by the Tribunal, Chuter also argues that  “not every society expects 
ordinary people to volunteer evidence unless asked,” and that the investigators may not have been thorough 
enough in their questioning to elicit full responses, responses which would later come out in the court 
room. CHUTER, supra note 21, at 157.
132 Akayesu, supra note 127, at para. 148.
133
 “Throughout the 1960's incursions on Rwandan soil were carried out by some of these refugees, who 
would enter and leave the country under the cover of the night, only rarely to be seen in the morning. This 
activity was likened to that of cockroaches, which are rarely seen during the day but often discovered at 
night, and accordingly these attackers were called Inyenzi.”  Id.  
134 See id. at para. 149.
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Ibyitso, which literally means “accomplice,” evolved in the early 1990s to refer to all 
Tutsi.135
Moreover, taking such linguistic nuances into account may be relatively simple 
compared to the additional, broader “cultural factors” that the Tribunal found were also 
affecting witness testimony.136  For example, the Tribunal received expert testimony that 
“most Rwandans live in an oral tradition in which facts are reported as they are perceived 
by the witness, often irrespective of whether the facts were personally witnessed or 
recounted by someone else.”137  Thus during the examination of certain witnesses, it was 
“at times clarified that evidence which had been reported as an eyewitness account was in 
fact a second-hand account of what was witnessed.”138  The expert witness explained that 
this was common in the Rwandan culture, but also that “the Rwandan community was 
like any other and that a clear distinction could be articulated by the witnesses between 
what they had heard and what they had seen.”139  The Trial Chamber therefore “made a 
consistent effort to ensure that this distinction was drawn throughout the trial 
proceedings.”140
Moreover, the Tribunal also received expert testimony that “it is a particular 
feature of the Rwandan culture that people are not always direct in answering questions, 
especially if the question is delicate.  In such cases, the answers given will very often 
have to be ‘decoded’ in order to be understood correctly.  This interpretation will rely on 
the context, the particular speech community, the identity of and the relation between the 
135 See id. at  para. 150.
136 Id. at para. 155-56.
137 Id. at para. 155 (emphasis added).
138 Id. 
139 Id.  
140 Id.
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orator and the listener, and the subject matter of the question.”141  The Trial Chamber 
noted specific instances of this in the proceedings: for example, several witnesses were 
reluctant or unwilling to state that the ordinary meaning of the term Inyenzi was 
cockroach, although all Rwandans know the meaning of the word.142  More generally, the 
Trial Chamber also attributed to “cultural constraints” the “difficulty [of some witnesses] 
to be specific as to dates, times, distances and locations.”143
In light of these observations, the “Chamber did not draw any adverse conclusions 
regarding the credibility of witnesses based only on their reticence and their sometimes 
circuitous responses to questions.”144  This is significant, as it acknowledges that in many 
cultures such “reticence” or “circuitous” testimony would affect a witness’s credibility.  
Indeed, the Judges’ inclusion of this discussion in the opinion reflects the fact that the 
Judges themselves would – in their home countries – likely have drawn a negative 
inference about these witnesses’ credibility.145  However, in this case, an insistence on the 
type of directness that the Judges would normally associate with truthfulness might have 
led them to discount truthful testimony and reach an unjust result.  The Judges therefore 
correctly recognized that they must consider the cultural differences between themselves 
and the witnesses before them in adjudicating the case.  
Similarly, in The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, the Trial Chamber found Georges 
Rutaganda, second vice-president of the youth wing of the Interahamwe - the youth 
141 Id. at para. 156.
142 See id. 
143 Id.  
144 Id.
145
 The Trial Chamber consisted of Presiding Judge Laity Kama from Senegal, Judge Lennert Aspegren 
from Sweden, and Navanethem Pillay from South Africa. 
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militia responsible for many of the killings - guilty of genocide and crimes against 
humanity and sentenced him to life in prison.146  The Trial Chamber noted that it had: 
taken into consideration various social and cultural factors 
in assessing the testimony of some of the witnesses. Some 
of these witnesses were farmers and people who did not 
have a high standard of education, and they had difficulty 
in identifying and testifying to some of the exhibits, such as 
photographs of various locations, maps etc.  These 
witnesses also experienced difficulty in testifying as to 
dates, times, distances, colours and motor vehicles.147
The Trial Chamber also noted “that many of the witnesses testified in Kinyarwanda and 
as such their testimonies were simultaneously translated into French and English.  As a 
result, the essence of the witnesses’ testimonies was at times lost.”148
On appeal,149 Rutaganda argued that the Trial Chamber committed an error of law 
“by improperly taking judicial notice of social and cultural factors.”150  Rutaganda argued 
that “social and cultural factors are not ‘matters of common knowledge’ in respect of 
which judicial notice should be taken” under the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
and that the Judges “made generalizations that were not corroborated by evidence or, 
especially, by expert opinion.”151  Thus, the defendant argued, “facts that were noted as 
being matters of common knowledge were in reality only matters of personal knowledge 
and stereotypes that the various members of the Trial Chamber may have had on the 
146 See The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3 (1999), available at 1999 WL 33288416, at 
paras. 2, 11; see also Alexandra L. Wisotsky, News From the International Tribunals, 8 NO. 3 HUM. RTS. 
BRIEF 18 (2004), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/08/3tribunals.cfm#12999.
147 Rutaganda, supra note 146, at para. 23.
148 Id.  For instance, Witness A testified at trial that he had four children who died in the genocide and one 
who survived.  In contrast, in a pre-trial statement he had stated that he had three children, all of whom had 
died.  The Trial Chamber concluded that this inconsistency was not material, and that it could be attributed 
to “difficulties of transcription and translation” relating to the pre-trial statements.  Thus the Trial Chamber 
did not draw any adverse inferences from these inconsistencies.  Id. at para. 292.
149 See ICTR v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A (2003), available at 2003 WL 23678345.
150 Id. at paras. 12, 223
151 Id. at para. 223.
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Rwandan people.”152  Rutaganda also criticized the Trial Chamber for applying the 
factors in a general way, without indicating the specific witnesses to which they 
applied.153
The Appeals Chamber rejected the defendant’s argument.  It held that the steps 
taken by the Trial Chamber could not be properly characterized as “judicial notice, the 
underlying purpose of which is to dispense with future proof of officially recorded facts 
that are indisputable.”154  Instead, the Appeals Chamber reasoned that “the Trial 
Judgment only states an observation that obviously dawned on the Trial Chamber as it 
heard the evidence given before it, namely, the fact that some of the persons heard were 
farmers and people who were not sufficiently literate, and that this situation had 
repercussions on the quality of their evidence . . . .”155
The Appeals Chamber also rejected the contention that the Trial Chamber 
improperly took a general approach rather than indicating “in which cases and to what 
extent, in its assessment, it applied the test based on the impact of socio or cultural 
factors.”156  The Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber acted properly in 
setting out an introductory observation, and that it was not required to “articulate every 
step of its reasoning for each particular finding it makes.”157  The Appeals Chamber also 
reasoned that the Trial Chamber had provided some specificity about the witnesses to 
whom its general observation applied, i.e., “farmers and people who did not have a high 
standard of education.”158
152 Id.
153 See id. at para. 223.
154 Id. at para. 225.
155 Id. at para. 226.
156 Id. at para. 228.
157 Id. 
158 Id. at para. 229.
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The Appeals Chamber then used the Example of Witness A, who “was born in a 
rural prefecture and lived in Rwanda all his life, spoke only Kinyarwanda, and was a 
mason by profession.”159  When asked to estimate a distance in kilometers, the witness 
instead gave a distance based on his own visual assessment.160  The witness also had 
difficulty giving directions in terms of north/south designations.161  The Appeals 
Chamber concluded that these difficulties “must be taken into account,” but that they “do 
not affect the testimony as a whole or its credibility.”162
Thus, once again the Tribunal refused to hold the witnesses to a “universal” 
standard of credibility – i.e., a standard that would conform more to the Judge’s own 
cultural expectations.  However, although the Trial Chamber probably should not be 
required to name each instance in which it considered cultural factors in evaluating 
testimony, it would nonetheless be better if the Trial Chamber did so in most cases.  Only 
then can the Appellate division, the defendants, the larger Rwandan community, and the 
international legal community truly evaluate whether these were appropriate exercises in 
cultural sensitivity, or whether at times the Tribunal may have seen “cultural” differences 
where they did not exist.  
Specifically, Rwandans have an interest in ensuring that the Tribunal does not 
characterize any cultural differences in such a way that they are perceived as inferiorities. 
For example, it is unclear whether the lack of a witnesses ability to give directions in 
north-south designations is truly due to “cultural differences” (e.g., this mode of direction 
159 Id. 
160 See id.  The witness stated:  “I lived on the hill and the airport was located on a different hill.  You can 
see the hill from us, as the crow flied, from our home.”  Id.
161 See id. 
162 Id. at para. 230.  Interestingly, the Appeals Chamber did not address the issue of the inconsistency with 
regard to the number of Witness A’s children.  See note 148, supra.  Presumably, either Rutaganda did not 
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is not used in some segments of Rwandan society) or was due to the fact that a particular 
individual was not educated.  In fact, the Appeals Chamber appears to favor the later 
explanation, while also giving lip service to the notion of true “cultural” differences that 
can affect witness testimony.  
Thus the Trial Chamber should endeavor in the future to be more specific about 
the particular witnesses to whom it applies these standards, and in relation to which part 
of their testimony.  Nevertheless, the ICTR should be commended for recognizing the 
cultural issues that are raised by its work, rather than taking a radical universalist 
approach that could have interfered with its ability to do justice.
2. Genocide and the Definition of “Ethnicity”
Cultural differences may also affect the application of international legal concepts 
to specific fact situations.  For example, the Akayesu decision reflected the first time that 
an international court found an individual guilty of genocide, but this was not a foregone 
conclusion as a matter of law.  Article 2(2) of the ICTR’s statute reflects, verbatim, the 
definition of genocide as contained in the Genocide Convention.163  Genocide “means 
any of [a series of] acts . . . committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such,” including, inter alia, “killing 
members of the group [or] causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group.”164  The Trial Chamber found as fact that the defendant engaged in these acts with 
the intent to destroy the Tutsi.165  Yet as described supra, it is debatable whether the 
raise the issue on Appeal, or the Appeals chamber also accepted that the inconsistency was a translation or 
transcription error.  
163 See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 103, art. 2; see also Akayesu, supra 
note 127, at para. 494.
164 Akayesu, supra note 127, at para. 113; see also Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra
note 103, art. 2.
165 See Akayesu, supra note 127, at paras. 167-460.
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Tutsis constituted a separate group, ethnic, racial, or otherwise, at the time of the 
massacre.166
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber recognized that “in the context of the period in 
question,” the Tutsi and Hutu “were, in consonance with a distinction made by the 
colonizers, considered both by the authorities and themselves as belonging to two distinct 
ethnic groups . . . .”167 The Trial Chamber also noted that “in a patrilineal society like 
Rwanda, the child belongs to the father’s group of origin,” and that pregnant Hutu 
women were killed on the ground that Tutsi men fathered the fetuses they carried.168
Thus, because the victims were not chosen as individuals or because they were RPF 
fighters, but rather due to their membership in the “Tutsi ethnic group,” the Trial 
Chamber concluded that genocide was committed “against the Tutsi as a group.”169  The 
Tribunal thereby adopted “a strikingly modern definition of an ethnic group that accepts 
its constructed nature while acknowledging the power and potency of ethnic self-
determination.”170
Similarly, in Rutaganda, the Trial Chamber stated that there were currently no 
“internationally accepted precise definitions” of “the concepts of national, ethnical, 
racial, and religious groups,” and that therefore “[e]ach of these concepts must be 
assessed in light of  a particular political, social and cultural context.”171  The Court also 
held that, for purposes of applying the Genocide Convention, membership in a particular 
group is a subjective concept – the victim either perceives him/herself as belonging to a 
166 See also id. at para. 123 (“[O]ne can hardly talk of ethnic groups as regards Hutu and Tutsi, given that 
they share the same language and culture.”).
167 Id. at para. 122 n.56.
168 Id. at para. 121.
169 Id. at para. 126.
170
 Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu Judgment, supra note 97, at 360.
171 Rutaganda, supra note 146, at para. 56.
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group and/or the perpetrator perceives the victim as belonging to the group slated for 
destruction.172  Thus the Trial Chamber held that “in assessing whether a particular group 
may be considered as protected from the crime of genocide, [we] will proceed on a case-
by-case basis, taking into account both the relevant evidence proffered and the political 
and cultural context . . . .”173  The Trial Chamber also agreed with the Akayesu judgment 
that although the Tutsi population does not have its own language or a culture distinct 
from other Rwandans, “there were a number of objective indicators of the group as a 
group with a distinct identity.”174  These included the identity cards that all Rwandans 
were required to carry, Rwandan laws in force prior to 1994 that identified Rwandans by 
reference to their ethnic group, and “customary rules . . . governing the determination of 
ethnic group, which followed patrilineal lines.”175  Considering both these subjective and 
objective factors, the Trial Chamber concluded that the “identification of persons as 
belonging to the group of Hutu or Tutsi or Twa had thus become embedded in Rwandan 
culture,” and concluded that the Tutsi qualified as a stable and permanent ethnic group 
under the Genocide Convention.176
Thus in these cases the interpretation and implementation of a universal norm –
the prohibition against genocide – was informed and assisted by a consideration of the 
specific cultural context in which a potential genocide occurred.  Conceivably, the 
172 See id.
173 Id. at para. 58 (emphasis added).
174 Id. at para. 374.
175 Id. 
176 Id. at paras. 374-77 (emphasis added); but see CHUTER, supra note 21, at 84-88 (criticizing the ICTR’s 
finding of genocide as a political decision that ultimately weakens the legal definition of the crime).  Chuter 
also acknowledges, however, that “[i]n the period when the Genocide Convention was drafted . . . it was 
generally assumed that ‘nations were genetically different from each other.  . . . [Also, at that time] ethnic 
groups were supposed to be primordial entities rigidly and permanently distinguished from each other.  
More recently, as the debates about ethnicity have grown more complex, it is becoming clear that it is a 
variable concept, constructed often by elites for their own benefit.”  Id. at 87.  Thus while Chuter argues, 
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Tribunal could have adopted a rigid, radical universalist view that only “ethnic groups” as 
defined by “objective” Western sociologists would meet the definition under the 
Genocide Convention.  Instead, the Tribunal correctly recognized the fluidity of culture 
and context, and did justice to the real-world experience of the Rwandan Tutsis.177
3. Sentencing Practices
As discussed supra, the lack of a death penalty option at the ICTR was one reason 
that the Rwandan government voted against the establishment of the Tribunal.  
Nevertheless, there are other aspects of the ICTR sentencing structure that are more 
sensitive to the Rwandan culture and judicial system.  Specifically, Article 23 of the 
ICTR Statute states that “[t]he penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to 
imprisonment.  In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chamber shall have 
recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda.”178
This again reflects a form of “mild” cultural relativism, in this instance built into 
the ICTR Statute itself.  Under this provision, two people – one in Rwanda and one in 
Yugoslavia – could commit the exact same act with the exact same mens rea, and both be 
found guilty of the same crime.  However, if the sentencing practices in Rwanda (which 
presumably reflect Rwandan cultural preferences) were harsher than those of 
Yugoslavia,179 the Rwandan defendant could receive a harsher sentence for the same act.  
perhaps correctly, that “[t]his is not what the ‘crime of crimes’ was supposed to look like [in the 1940s],” 
he concedes that he is describing the initial Western ‘race science’ conception of the crime.
177
 Similarly, the ICTR held that with respect to the crime of “direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide,” the “direct element of incitement should be viewed in the light of its cultural and linguistic 
content.  Indeed, a particular speech may be perceived as ‘direct’ in one country, and not so in another, 
depending on the audience.  . . .  On this subject, see above, in the findings of the Chamber on Evidentiary 
Matters, the developments pertaining to the [expert] analysis of the Kinyarwanda language . . . .”  Akayesu, 
supra note 127, at para. 557 & n. 130.   
178
 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 103, at art. 23.
179
 The governing statute for the ICTY contains an identical provision requiring that in imposing sentence, 
that body “shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former 
Yugoslavia.”  Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, annexed to Report of the 
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This might be unfair to the individual defendant, but a contrary result would arguably 
ignore the needs of Rwandan victims to see justice done in a way that accords with their 
cultural expectations.
A specific example of the ICTR’s sentencing practice helps to illustrate the point.  
In The Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, the accused, a Belgian journalist who moved to 
Rwanda and broadcast discriminatory and threatening remarks against the Tutsis and 
others on Rwandan radio, pled guilty to incitement to commit genocide.180  In sentencing 
Mr. Ruggiu, the Tribunal noted Article 23’s requirement that it take Rwandan sentencing 
practices into account.181  Under Rwandan domestic law, perpetrators of genocide or 
crimes against humanity are grouped into categories:  Category 1 offenders are those who 
were “among planners, organizers, supervisors and leaders” of the genocide, persons who 
“acted in positions of authority,” or “[n]otorious murderers” who “distinguished 
themselves” “by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they committed 
atrocities.”182  Category 2 offenders are those whose acts “place them among the 
perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious assault 
against the person causing death.”183  Under Rwandan law, the sentence for Persons 
found guilty of Category 1 offensives is the mandatory death penalty, and for Persons in 
Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N.S.C.Doc. 
S/25704, para. 49 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1163, 1186 (1993), at art. 24.  
180 See The Prosecutor v. Ruggiu; Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, available at 2000 WL 33348736;
see also Wisotsky, supra note 146.
181 See Ruggiu, supra note 180, at para. 27.
182 Id. para. 28.  
183 Id.  Category 3 offenders are those guilty of “other serious assaults against the person,” and Category 4 
offenses are those who “committed offenses against property.”  Id.
40
Category 2 it is life imprisonment.184  However, persons in Category 2 or below can have 
their sentence reduced by entering a plea of guilty.185
The Tribunal concluded that Ruggiu would most likely fall under “Category 
Two” in the Rwandan system.  The Trial Chamber then noted that, under Rwandan law, 
those who pled guilty after prosecution for a Category Two offense receive 12-15 years 
in prison.186  The Tribunal also noted, however, that it was not required to conform to 
Rwandan sentencing practice, but was merely obliged to “take account” of that 
practice.187  “[W]hile the Chamber will refer as much as practicable to the sentencing 
provisions under the [Rwandan] law, it will also exercise its unfettered discretion to 
determine sentences.”188
In considering the appropriate sentence for Mr. Ruggiu, the Trial Chamber noted 
that “[t]he accused is a European with a moderate level of education, who is inspired by a 
sense of justice.”189  The Trial Chamber also stated that “[d]efense counsel submitted that 
the accused was indoctrinated by a biased picture of the socio-political situation in 
Rwanda.  The Chamber takes into account that the accused was not sufficiently 
knowledgeable to be able to make informed assessments of the situation.  . . .  [T]he 
accused was a person of good character imbued with ideals before he became involved in 
the events in Rwanda.”190  The Trial Chamber then sentenced Ruggiu to two 12-year 
sentences, to be served concurrently.191
184 Id. at para. 29.
185 See id. at para. 29.
186 See id. at para. 30.
187 Id.  
188 Id. at para. 31.
189 Id. at para. 62.
190 Id. at para. 63.
191 See id. at Part IV, Verdict.
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The Trial Chamber was correct to conform Mr. Ruggiu’s sentence to Rwandan 
sentencing practices.  However, the Chamber’s references to Ruggiu’s European 
background and seeming “corruption” by his visits to Rwanda are deeply troubling.  This 
language implies that the Chamber was more lenient with the defendant on the theory 
that, as a European, Mr. Ruggiu is the product of a more “just” culture.192  If true, this 
would be a gross mistake.  Perhaps this is an example where one positive cultural 
relativist notion (Rwandan victims deserve sentencing consistent with their own cultural 
notions of justice) balanced a negative cultural relativist notion (Europeans are more 
“just” and less violent than Rwandans) to arrive at a sentence that, though light, was at 
least consistent with Rwanda’s own sentencing practices.193
IV. Lessons for the Future 
At first glance, there would appear to be little room for cultural relativism with 
regard to war crimes.  Indeed, in responding to a particular situation, international actors 
– particularly those from the West – should never ignore or minimize these crimes simply 
because they occurred in a culture dissimilar to our own.  Thus claims for dissimilar 
treatment in war crimes prosecution on the basis of culture should be treated with 
caution, particularly with regards to Africa.  The international community could easily 
hide its own neglect, or regime elites could hide their abuses, behind a veil of cultural 
sensitivity.  Therefore, because the trend appears to be for the prosecution of war crimes 
by international tribunals, these tribunals should apply to persons of all cultures equally.  
192
 The Judges who issued this Judgement and Sentence were Presiding Judge Navanethem Pillay of South 
Africa, Judge Erik Møse of Norway, and Judge Pavel Dolenc of Slovenia.  
193 But cf. Andrew N. Keller, Punishment for Violations of International Criminal Law:  An Analysis of 
Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR, 12 IND. INT’L & COMP. REV. 53 (2001) (evaluating the sentencing 
practices of the ICTR and ICTY and concluding that in general these bodies were not giving enough weight 
to Rwandan and Yugoslav sentencing practices).
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However, there is also room for caution.  The establishment of the ICTR by the 
U.N. Security Council probably went too far in embracing “universal” values at the 
expense of the true needs of the Rwandan people.  Specifically, certain aspects of the 
Tribunal’s statute appeared to contradict Rwandan notions of justice.  The absence of the 
death penalty, for example, raised the specter of moral imperialism, especially in light of 
the fact that those found guilty at Nuremberg were given the death penalty.194  More 
generally, the establishment of the Tribunal over the opposition of the post-genocidal 
government will do very little to further the rule of law in Rwanda or to assist in building 
the capacity of the Rwandan judicial system.
As discussed supra, the ICTR has tried in its operations to strike a balance 
between universalism and cultural relativism concerns.  Nevertheless, the Tribunal has 
not “made real contact with the populace[] affected by [its] proceedings.  [It is] perceived 
as distant and unconcerned with the effect of [its] activities upon victims.”195  The very 
fact that the Tribunal is struggling with these difficulties should warn us against rushing 
to establish international tribunals that will apply international law without prior input 
from or knowledge about the affected culture.  Judge Wald reached a similar conclusion 
with respect to the ICTY: 
My experience with the inner workings of an international 
court suggests care. With careful self and public scrutiny, 
such courts can responsibly perform important adjudication 
and accountability functions that national courts in the 
thrall of leaders who are themselves alleged war criminals 
194 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 5.  If the United Nations strongly believes that the 
imposition of the death penalty violates modern international norms of justice (or, put in cultural relativism 
terms, that the death penalty is not a “cultural value” or is not a value worthy of international recognition), 
then one possibility might have been to negotiate assistance that would have provided more long-term 
capacity building for the Rwandan judicial system in exchange for the abolition of the death penalty in 
Rwanda’s domestic criminal law.  Of course, this solution would likely have met resistance from other 
members of the United Nations who continue to impose the death penalty in their own domestic systems.  
195
 Wald, Accountability for War Crimes, supra note 31, at 192.
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cannot.  However, they should be reserved for just such 
extreme situations.196
At the time the Tribunal was established, Rwanda was no longer “in the thrall” of 
its previous genocidal government.  Of course, Rwanda did need international assistance, 
and badly.  Moreover, the presence of international judges and other legal personnel can 
have a beneficial effect on war crimes prosecutions.  For example, “the presence of 
international judges can help to (a) educate local judges on international law and minimal 
standards of fairness, (b) create an impression of impartiality, and (c) insulate local 
judges to some degree against intimidation from their own governments.”197  Thus 
international involvement in these situations can be useful and should not be completely 
rejected.  Nonetheless, in the case of the ICTR, it would have been better to seek a 
compromise such that the Tribunal would have involved more participation by Rwandans 
and better consideration of Rwandan needs.  
Hybrid courts, or courts which have aspects of both international and national 
courts, likely reflect the best balance between universalism and cultural relativism 
concerns in this respect.198  Hybrid models have several advantages over “pure” 
international models: they are generally cheaper to establish and operate, and – key to the 
cultural relativism debate – they are “considered to be politically less divisive, more 
meaningful to victim populations, and more effective at rebuilding local justice 
systems.”199  In addition, because hybrid courts typically consist of both domestic and 
foreign judges, local judges may be able to explain relevant cultural norms to their 
196
 Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age, supra note 46, at 
117-18.
197 See Wald, Accountability for War Crimes, supra note 31, at 194.
198 See, e.g., Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age, supra
note 46, at 118 (“[I] am happy to see the newer proposed U.N. tribunals relying more on tribunals located 
closer to the countries involved and composed in part, at least, of jurists from these countries.”)
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international colleagues, thus lessening the need for costly and time consuming expert 
witness testimony and decreasing the chance of error in interpreting cultural norms.
For example, the hybrid “Special Court” for Sierra Leone is prosecuting those 
who allegedly committed war crimes in that country’s civil war.200  The Sierra Leone 
Tribunal differs from the ICTR model in several respects:  (1) it is based on a treaty 
between the United Nations and Sierra Leone, as opposed to the ICTY and ICTR which 
were established pursuant to the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers; (2) the Special 
Court has the ability to consider not only violations of international humanitarian law, but 
also certain crimes under Sierra Leonean domestic law; (3) while it has primacy over 
domestic prosecutions in Sierra Leone, it lacks primacy over national courts of third party 
states; and (4) most importantly for our purposes, “unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which are 
composed exclusively of international judges elected by the U.N. General Assembly and 
a Prosecutor selected by the Security Council, the Special Court is . . . composed of both 
international and Sierra Leonean judges, prosecutors, and staff . . . .”201
More specifically, of the three judges who sit in each trial chamber of the Special 
Court, one is appointed by Sierra Leone and two are appointed by the U.N. Secretary 
General, and of the five judges who serve in the Appeals chamber, two are appointed by 
the Government of Sierra Leone and three by the Secretary-General.202  The Sierra Leone 
199
 Udombana, supra note 31, at 246.
200 See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/605/32/PDF/N0060532.pdf?OpenElement; see also 
Udombana, supra note 31, at 56.  It is estimated that between 100,000 and 200,000 people died during the 
10-year civil war beginning in 1991.  See Nancy Kaymar Stafford, A Model War Crimes Court: Sierra 
Leone, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 117, 120 (2003).
201
 Udombana, supra note 31, at 84, 130, 132; see also Stafford, supra note 200, at 126.
202 See Udombana, supra note 31, at 86; see also Agreement Between the United Nations and the 
Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Annex to Report of 
the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 
(2000), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-agreement.html.
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government can, but is not required to, appoint judges from Sierra Leone.203 The 
Secretary General also appoints the Prosecutor for a four-year term,204 who shall be 
independent from any government, but the Deputy Prosecutor must be a Sierra 
Leonean.205  The Prosecutor may also have other Sierra Leonean or international staff.206
Thus the Special Court is more inclusive than the ICTR in several respects, thereby 
recognizing the value of participation by those most affected by the crimes under its 
jurisdiction.
Another advantage of the Special Court is the fact that it is located in Sierra 
Leone.207  There are significant advantages to having the court “on site”: it gives the 
Court better and timelier access to witnesses and evidence, makes site visits possible 
without long delays in the trials, and may make victims and witnesses more comfortable 
when testifying.208  It can also help strengthen the legal system in Sierra Leone, by giving 
the government significant involvement in the establishment and administration of the 
court, as well as by leaving behind the actual physical structure of the Court – no small 
matter in one of the poorest countries in the world.209  In addition, it will give the local 
population greater access to the court’s proceedings, and allow local journalists to 
provide current updates in native languages.210
203 See Udombana, supra note 31, at 88 (noting that the Sierra Leonean government’s first appointments 
consisted of one Sierra Leonean judge for the trial chamber, and one Sierra Leonan judge and one judge 
from the United Kingdom for the Appeals Chamber); see also U.N. Press Release, Appointment to Sierra 
Leonean Special Court, SG/A/813, AFR/444 of July 26, 2002, at http://www.UN.org/News/Press/docs/
2002/sga813.doc.htm. 
204 See Udombana, supra note 31, at 89.  David Crane of the United States was appointed as the Special 
Court’s first Prosecutor in May 2002.  See id.  
205 See id. 
206 See id.
207 See id. at 133.
208 See id. 
209 See id. 
210 See id. at 134.
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Of course, a purely international tribunal could also be located within the country 
where the crimes occurred, so this is not an inherent advantage of hybrid courts over the 
ICTY/ICTR model.  Nonetheless, the location of a court in the country of origin reflects 
an important improvement in terms of the universalism/cultural relativism debate: it 
allows the local population to accept the court as part of the local culture, and it helps to 
lessen the perception of outsider justice and moral imperialism while still involving the 
international community in the process.  The inclusion of domestic crimes within the 
court’s mandate should also be an advantage in this respect, as these laws may reflect 
local culture more directly and fully than do purely international norms.  
Of course, hybrid courts are not a panacea for all of the problems inherent in war 
crimes prosecutions.  Because of the participation of international judges, hybrid courts 
will inevitably have the same language and translation difficulties that plague any 
international tribunal.211  In addition, since hybrid courts are more likely to apply a 
mixture of international and national law, they will need to interpret domestic law 
correctly – a task with which the ICTR has apparently had some difficulty.212  Of course,
the risk of error should be lessened by the presence of at least some judges from the 
affected country on the court, but these judges may have to take extra care monitoring the 
work of their international colleagues.  
It could also be argued that the inclusion of local judges on hybrid courts will 
make the proceedings more biased (either in favor of or against the defendants) and thus 
less likely to achieve legitimacy with the local or international communities.213  Or put in 
211 See, e.g., Tom Briody, Defending War Crimes in Africa: The Special Court for Sierra Leone, 29-F EB. 
CHAMPION 34 (2005); cf. CHUTER, supra note 21, at 207, 217.
212 See, e.g., Morris, Rwandan Justice and the International Criminal Court, supra note 126, at 352-53.
213 See Stafford, supra note 200, at 140.
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the context of the cultural relativism debate, the inclusion of local judges could further 
(or be perceived as furthering) negative aspects of the local culture.  This argument might 
have extra force where, as in Rwanda, local judges would almost inevitably be a member 
of one of the disputing racial or ethnic groups.  However, this problem would also be 
inherent in any domestic tribunal, and thus the presence of international judges on hybrid 
courts should reduce any perceived or real bias.  Perhaps this is also a good reason to 
have a majority of the judges come from or be appointed by third countries, as is the case 
with the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
Hybrid courts have also suffered from funding difficulties – for example, the 
Sierra Leone Special Court was to be funded by voluntary contributions, a problematic 
approach that can lead to serious budget shortfalls.214  However, this is not a problem 
inherent in the hybrid system, and the ICTR and ICTY have also had funding struggles.  
Rather, it reflects that fact that any court, in order to be successful, must be given the 
resources it needs to fulfill its mandate.  The funding problem does, however, reflect the 
fact that more needs to be done to convince the international community of the 
advantages of the hybrid system.  Although it may not look as inherently “international” 
as some tribunals (and thus the international community may be more tempted to say “it’s 
not our concern”) – in reality the hybrid model reflects a wise compromise between the 
international and domestic systems, and is probably a better way for the international 
community to spend its money.  
The existence of the International Criminal Court does not moot the issue.  
Although the ICC will undoubtedly be an important factor in war crimes prosecutions, 
due to various factors (especially the resistance of the United States to the court) it 
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appears unlikely that it will become the sole international body to prosecute war crimes in 
the foreseeable future.215  Thus hybrid tribunals may have an important role to play, and
should be considered in any instance where the ICC can not or does not assume 
jurisdiction over international crimes. 
Nevertheless, the ICC will likely be a major force in the future of war crimes 
punishments, and it should be aware of universalism/cultural relativism issues as it 
pursues its mandate.  As a “pure” international court, the ICC may inherently tilt too far 
toward radical universalism ideas, as with the ICTR.216  However, because it is a treaty 
body, at some point the affected local government (or the government of the defendant) 
will have agreed to its jurisdiction, thus hopefully representing some consent by the local 
214 See e.g., id. at 138-39.
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culture.217  In addition, unlike the ICTR, which can require any national court to 
relinquish jurisdiction over a defendant under its mandate,218 the Rome Statute provides 
that cases will be admissible only if national justice systems are “unwilling or unable 
genuinely” to investigate or prosecute.219  In terms of the universalism/cultural relativism 
debate, this is an improvement, and should allow the court to avoid many of the pitfalls 
that other international tribunals have encountered.  Most importantly, it gives the 
country affected the chance to implement justice according to local customs and norms, 
yet it still gives the ICC the opportunity to assume jurisdiction if the local efforts are 
nonexistent or merely sham proceedings. 
Finally, the ICC can strike the proper balance between universalism and cultural 
relativism concerns by “working with local governments to get their systems in shape 
rather than merely fighting off their efforts to resist ICC jurisdiction.”220  The ICC can 
also work in conjunction with hybrid tribunals: at least one scholar has proposed the 
establishment of joint initiatives between the ICC and national or hybid courts.221
Finally, where it does assume jurisdiction, the ICC can and should follow the lead of the 
ICTR in recognizing and taking into account cultural differences when they arise.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, judges and others involved in international war crimes prosecutions 
must be aware of the dangers of both radical universalism and radical cultural relativism.  
They should attempt to strike a balance that will recognize legitimate cultural differences 
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– particularly when those differences may make it more difficult to uncover the truth 
about what occurred – but without ignoring the danger of using cultural relativism as a 
shield behind which to hide atrocities.  A “mild” cultural relativism approach is the best 
way to accomplish these goals.  This approach applauds the involvement of the 
international community in war crimes prosecutions, regardless of the identity of the 
victims.  However, this approach also recognizes the value of the cultural sensitivity and 
encourages the international community to understand and work with the culture of those 
whom it seeks to judge.  The best balance can be struck by establishing hybrid tribunals 
and/or by international tribunals exercising jurisdiction only where the domestic courts 
are unable or unwilling to do so.  By following this approach, the international 
community can further the cause of universal justice without alienating the very people it 
is designed to serve.
